

Vol. 1
1957

INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT

by

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No. 22
June 11

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Editorial Research Reports
1156 Nineteenth Street, N.W.
Washington

INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT

AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE of fruitless negotiation, the tenor and course of discussions being carried on in London by the five-nation subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission¹ have raised a measure of hope that a beginning can be made in the not distant future on a program of arms control under international inspection. Opened in mid-March and resumed the last week in May after a ten-day recess, the London talks have been notable for the changed behavior of the Russians and for a drawing together of United States and Soviet positions on the general concept of inspection.

Secretary of State Dulles noted, May 14, that while the Soviet rulers had at first rejected President Eisenhower's proposal for aerial inspection "as a matter of principle," they now had modified their thinking "to the extent that, instead of discussion *whether* or not there would be such inspection, they accept it in principle, and the debate now is *where* will there be such inspection."

Harold E. Stassen, chief U.S. representative at the London meeting, told reporters that he was "cautiously optimistic" that the talks would produce at least limited agreement on the start of an arms reduction plan.² The United States and the Soviet Union both appear to realize that they must make a beginning on arms control rather than attempt any grandiose scheme of total disarmament at this time.

The "critical aspect" of the disarmament problem, Dulles told newsmen in mid-May, continued to be "the possibility

¹ The subcommittee is composed of representatives of Britain, Canada, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Disarmament Commission comprises the 11 members of the U.N. Security Council plus Canada.

² Soviet party chief Nikita S. Khrushchev said in a panel discussion with American newsmen, telecast in the United States on June 2, that Russia was ready to take a first small step toward disarmament that "might lead to something bigger." Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin stated, June 5, that Russia was "ready to conclude an appropriate agreement on the whole program of disarmament" as well as "on its particular aspects."

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[of devising and gaining] acceptance of a system of inspection and control." He said the United States would not reduce its military strength "merely in reliance on . . . promises . . . which cannot be verified." The latest U.S. disarmament package, taken back to London by Stassen on May 27, was understood to include an inspection scheme which does not differ greatly in principle from one advanced last Apr. 30 by the Soviet Union.

Dulles stated on May 29, after Stassen had departed, that the United States attached "top priority to getting a substantial inspection zone wherever . . . [it could] get it quickly." He said Washington was willing to accept such a zone, whether in Europe or elsewhere, so long as it offered a "real test of good faith" and enabled "the significance and the requirements of aerial and ground inspection to be tested."

President Eisenhower had observed a week earlier that the first concern of the United States should be to make certain that it was not being "recalcitrant" or "picayunish" about reaching a disarmament agreement. "We ought to have an open mind and make it possible for others, if they are reasonable, logical men, to meet us half way so we can make these agreements."³ Later in May the President reportedly told government officials who were opposing certain plans:⁴ "It is not enough merely to be against these proposals. If you don't like them, O.K., but come up with a positive alternative. We have to move ahead on this thing."

The Eisenhower administration has taken steps to move ahead on the domestic, as well as on the international, front. While the new plan to be offered at London was being worked out, Dulles and Stassen held consultations on May 23 with the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament.⁵ Inasmuch as any formal disarmament agreement would have to be submitted in treaty form for Senate ratification, the meeting at the Capitol was seen as an effort to pave the way for ultimate Senate acceptance. It was viewed also as an attempt to prepare the senators

³ The President's remarks were interpreted as a rebuke to Adm. Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had told reporters on May 19 that "We cannot trust the Russians on this or anything."

⁴ According to James Reston in *New York Times*, May 28, 1957.

⁵ The subcommittee, set up in 1955 and headed by Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), consists of six members of the Foreign Relations Committee, four members of the Armed Services Committee, and two members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. It held extensive hearings between January 1956 and March 1957.

psychologically, and through them the public, for the possibility that Soviet inspection planes would one day be flying over the United States.

Postwar Negotiations On Arms Inspection

EFFECTIVE INSPECTION has been at the heart of American disarmament policy ever since the advent of nuclear weapons. During much of the postwar period the Soviet Union denied the importance of inspection and argued for immediate prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic arms. Negotiations during the first half of the postwar decade were influenced by the fact that the United States alone possessed atomic weapons while Russia had overwhelming superiority in military manpower. Under those circumstances the United States wanted international control of nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union wanted merely to "ban the bomb."

After Russia had broken the American monopoly by exploding its first atomic device in September 1949, Moscow began to give more serious consideration to inspection. During most of the second half of the postwar decade, it still refused, however, to spell out exactly what it meant by "inspection" or to sanction unrestricted inspection on Soviet territory. Only in the last year have the Russians come around to accepting the idea of effective inspection.

When the United Nations began consideration of atomic controls in mid-1946, the United States proposed creation of an international authority to conduct continuous inspection of all phases of the production of fissionable materials. Measures to ensure enforcement of international control regulations were not to be subject to any veto power.

The Soviet Union at first rejected the American proposals as infringing national sovereignty, but in November 1946 the principle of international inspection was nominally accepted. However, Russia insisted that the right of veto must extend to inspection operations.⁶ When the General

⁶ See "International Inspection," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1946, pp. 850-854; "International Control of Atomic Energy," *E.R.R.*, Vol. I 1948, pp. 77-82.

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Assembly in November 1948 approved the so-called U.N. majority plan embodying the American proposal and calling for an international control agency to carry out aerial and ground inspection, the Soviet Union remained adamantly opposed.

EAST-WEST PROPOSALS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS, 1950-1955

Notwithstanding the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, new proposals for disarmament were put forward by the major powers in 1951 but these had little chance of adoption. Great Britain, France, and the United States joined in proposing a program for (1) progressive disclosure, on a continuing basis, of all armed forces and armaments; (2) international inspection to provide verification; (3) adoption of the U.N. majority plan for control of atomic energy. Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet delegate, said he "laughed all night" over that plan.⁷

Early in 1952 Vishinsky offered a substitute proposal for simultaneous prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international controls. The control agency was to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but it was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of any nation. The United States advanced a more comprehensive program for continuing disclosure and verification of military information, proceeding from the least secret to the most secret. Information disclosed at each stage was to be verified, in part by aerial inspection, before the next stage was undertaken. The Russians reiterated earlier Soviet proposals, but the Western powers doubted their sincerity, because Moscow was using the Disarmament Commission at the time to air charges that U.N. forces in Korea had resorted to bacteriological warfare.

In view of its continued failure to reach agreement, the Disarmament Commission in April 1954 set up the five-nation subcommittee now meeting in London to seek "in private" an "acceptable solution" to the arms question.⁸ At its first session the United States proposed establishment of an international atomic development authority empowered to supervise progressive, continuous disclosure of all

⁷ An earlier French proposal for a census and verification of conventional armaments and armed forces had been vetoed by the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council in 1949.

⁸ A hydrogen bomb of awesome destructive power had been tested in the South Pacific by the United States the month before. The first U.S. detonation of a "hydrogen device" had taken place in November 1952. Russia announced in August 1953 that it had exploded a similar device.

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armed forces and armaments. Verification was to be accomplished by a variety of means, including use of aerial and field surveys; inspectors were to be stationed permanently in the participating countries.

The U.S.S.R. rejected the American plan on the ground that the international authority might be in position to interfere in the internal affairs of states. Previous Russian proposals for simultaneous prohibition of nuclear weapons and establishment of international arms control were repeated. The control agency proposed by Russia was to inspect the extraction and production of atomic energy materials but was to hold aloof from domestic affairs.⁹

In an attempt to clarify the West's concept of international control, the four Western delegations submitted to the subcommittee in April 1955 a joint draft resolution setting forth the powers that should be accorded a control agency. It should have authority to conduct field and aerial surveys for verification of disclosures and its officials should be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament agreement. Inspectors should have the right of (1) unrestricted access to, egress from, and travel within the territory of the participating states; (2) unrestricted access to all installations to which their duties required them to go; (3) unrestricted use of communications facilities; (4) inviolability of person, premises, property, and archives.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL OF KEY POINT ALARM SYSTEM

Blossoming of Moscow's peaceful coexistence campaign in the spring of 1955 brought a change in the Soviet position on arms control. At the meeting of the disarmament subcommittee in May, the U.S.S.R. offered a resolution containing the usual array of recommendations but at the same time reflecting certain new considerations.

In an era of international tension, said the Russians, nations could hardly be expected to trust each other to the extent of granting access to vital installations. Even under a formal international control agreement there would be "opportunities . . . for evading . . . control and organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen

⁹"During the entire period of the subcommittee negotiations, the U.S.S.R. delegate refused to provide satisfactory or informative answers to the persistent questioning of Western delegates as to precise meanings and definitions of Soviet terms and concepts set forth in their proposals."—White House Disarmament Staff, *Reference Documents on Disarmament Matters* (1957), p. 23.

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weapons." A potential aggressor could accumulate stocks of nuclear weapons for a surprise attack. But it was clear that war preparations would necessitate the concentration and movement of large formations of land, sea, and air forces through "important communication centers, ports, and airfields."

In order to prevent surprise attacks, the Russians recommended that the General Assembly set up an international organ with power to establish control posts at large ports, rail junctions, main motor highways, and airfields in all participating states. These posts would ensure that "no dangerous concentration" of military forces took place. Furthermore, the agency was to have access to all records relating to military appropriations; and was to be furnished periodically with reports on the execution of measures called for in the disarmament treaty.

At a later stage of the Soviet program, the international agency was to have its own permanent inspectors in all signatory states to make sure that requirements of the treaty were being carried out. The inspectors were to be given "unimpeded access at all times, within the limits of the supervisory functions they exercise, to all objects of control."

Western observers thought the key-points proposal a notable improvement over previous Soviet offers although its control aspects remained obscure. James J. Wadsworth, U.S. representative on the disarmament subcommittee, noted on May 11, 1955, that the Soviet proposal did not make clear, for example, whether the inspectors could "go everywhere and see everything necessary to make sure that forbidden munitions are not being manufactured or that nuclear weapons are not being secreted."

References in the Soviet proposal to the possibilities of clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons and surprise attack reflected the changed technological situation that confronted the negotiators in the spring of 1955. Large plants were no longer needed for production of nuclear materials, and relatively small amounts could be made to yield vastly greater explosive power than previously.

Any country wishing to evade controls could hide a steadily increasing number of nuclear weapons and so shield

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them as to defy any known method of detection. The older plans for inspection of production facilities were recognized as outmoded; the principal problem of inspection had become prevention of surprise attack rather than accounting for past production of fissionable materials. Inspection of the means of delivering the weapons was now more important than inspection of the weapons themselves. It was against this background that President Eisenhower proposed his plan for exchange of blueprints and aerial inspection at the Geneva summit conference.

AMERICAN BLUEPRINT AND OPEN SKIES PLANS

Speaking at the opening of the summit conference on July 18, 1955, the President noted that surprise attack had a capacity for destruction "far beyond anything which man has yet known." He suggested that the problem of disarmament might best be approached "by seeking—as a first step—dependable ways to supervise and inspect military establishments, so that there can be no frightful surprises, whether by sudden attack or by secret violation of agreed restrictions." In that respect, he said, nothing was more important than the "challenging and central problem of effective mutual inspection." He termed mutual inspection the "foundation for real disarmament."

In a second address three days later, the President proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union "take a practical step . . . [and] begin an arrangement . . . immediately":

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other; lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country; . . . where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations . . .

By this step [we would seek] to convince the world that we are providing, as between ourselves, against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise, we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

The President's proposal drew attention away from all other disarmament schemes put forth at the conference.

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Premier Bulganin had reaffirmed the Soviet proposals for control posts at key points. Prime Minister Eden had suggested setting up a "simple, joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe"; he said that this might provide a "practical experiment in the operative inspection of armaments, . . . which if . . . locally successful, might extend outwards from the center to the periphery." The heads of government recommended that the U.N. disarmament subcommittee resume its discussions and that their foreign ministers attempt, at a forthcoming conference, to translate the general ideas put forward at the summit talks into actual agreements.

DETAIL OF EISENHOWER SUMMIT PROPOSALS

When the subcommittee met again on Aug. 30, 1955, Harold Stassen spelled out the Eisenhower ideas. "Blueprint of military establishments" was defined as consisting of the "identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of all major land, sea, and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations."

"Aerial reconnaissance" was described as including inspection by visual, photographic, and electronic means. Stassen disclosed also that the United States had added to the plan advanced by the President at Geneva a provision for ground observers stationed at key locations within each country. It would be their function to "certify the accuracy of the . . . [blueprint] information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization."

The blueprint exchange procedure called for preparation by the United States and the Soviet Union of lists that pin-pointed the deployment of major military units and the location of military facilities. The lists were to be exchanged according to schedules drawn up so as to "assure simultaneous delivery of similar types of information by each government, and completion of verification by each side before progressing to a subsequent phase." Such a procedure would seek to overcome a country's fear that it might release more vital information than it had received.

The procedure for verifying the blueprints required the stationing of on-the-spot observers with operating military

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forces, at supporting military installations, and at various key locations "as necessary for the verification, continued observation, and reporting of each category of information." To augment the efforts of those observers, each country was to conduct aerial reconnaissance on an "unrestricted, but monitored," basis.¹⁰

Each inspecting country was to use its own aircraft and equipment, but liaison personnel of the country being inspected were to be carried on all inspection planes. Flights of arriving and departing planes to and from home territory were to be monitored, and personnel, equipment, and aircraft were to be checked at specified ports of entry and departure.

SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO EISENHOWER GENEVA PROPOSALS

The Russians were dumbfounded when the President's plan was first announced at Geneva. Soviet party chief Khrushchev reportedly told Eisenhower that this was not a disarmament plan but an intelligence scheme. That view was to be propagated by Soviet spokesmen for many months. The official Soviet reply to the Eisenhower proposals was a long letter from Bulganin to the President on Sept. 19, 1955.

The Soviet premier said Russia had no objection "in principle" to exchange of military blueprints, but it believed that the required information should be submitted by all states—not by the United States and the Soviet Union alone—to an international control agency. The U.S.S.R. did object, however, to the open skies plan because it called for aerial surveys in only the United States and the Soviet Union, not in any of the countries in which they had bases. Aerial inspection should extend to all armed forces and military installations on the territories of allied states.

Bulganin concluded that, inasmuch as the Eisenhower plan did not mention prohibition of atomic weapons, aerial inspection "under present conditions" would not lead to effective progress toward disarmament. On the other hand, the Soviet proposal for control posts at key points would provide a "definite guaranty against a sudden attack." Replying to Bulganin in mid-October, the President re-

¹⁰ President Eisenhower said at a press conference, July 27, 1955, that he would let the inspecting planes "fly over any particular area of either country that they wanted to because . . . only in this way could . . . [one nation] convince . . . [another] that there wasn't something over there that maybe was, by surprise, ready to attack [it]."

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affirmed his belief that the open skies and blueprints plans would help dispel fear, and reiterated American willingness to accept the Soviet key-points proposal.

At the conference of foreign ministers in November, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov renewed Bulganin's complaint that the President's plan made "no provision at all for extending aerial photography and the exchange of military information to those states in which American bases have been established." It would increase, rather than lessen, the fear of surprise attack because each nation would worry that the other might use the knowledge gained by aerial inspection and receipt of blueprints to launch a devastating blow.

Secretary of State Dulles replied that, if the Soviet Union accepted the Eisenhower plan, the United States would attempt to have both it and the Bulganin proposal for control posts extended to countries in which there were American bases. The U.S.S.R. continued to insist, however, that the open skies plan be considered in connection with reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, and the foreign ministers adjourned their conference without reaching any agreement on disarmament.

GROWING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION CONCEPT

At London in March 1956, Britain and France submitted a joint plan for a comprehensive three-stage disarmament program aimed to reconcile United States insistence on inspection before arms reduction and the Soviet demand for reduction before inspection. The Anglo-French proposal called for a freeze on armaments and simultaneous initiation of aerial and ground inspection.

The United States gave support to some elements of that plan, but proposed two preliminary steps: (1) exchange of technical missions by the five nations on the disarmament subcommittee to study inspection and control problems, and (2) carrying out aerial surveys and setting up ground control posts in designated areas of 20,000 to 30,000 square miles in the United States and the Soviet Union as a demonstration project.

The preliminary steps were to be followed by (a) agreement on a general inspection and control plan embodying both the Eisenhower open skies proposal and the Soviet

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ground posts proposal, and (b). agreement on levels to which conventional forces and arms should be reduced. When these issues had been dealt with satisfactorily, military blueprints were to be exchanged, defense expenditures were to be frozen at their Dec. 31, 1955, levels, and the inspection and control system would be put in operation. Ultimately, the system would be expanded to cover production of fissionable materials and testing of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union proposed a reduction of conventional arms and forces over a three-year period. During the first two months of that period, an international control agency would be established to set up control posts at ports, rail junctions, highways, and airfields in the participating states. The control posts would be manned permanently by international inspectors who would have "unimpeded access" to all "objects of control." The objects were identified as military units, stores, and bases, as well as munitions plants.

After confidence among the participating states had improved, the "possibility of using aerial photography as one of the methods of control" was to be considered. The Soviet proposal added that, "as an important step towards solving the problem of disarmament," it would be desirable to establish a zone, composed of the two Germanys and the adjacent states, in which atomic weapons would be banned and limitation and inspection of armaments might be undertaken.

RECENT RUSSIAN CONCESSIONS ON AERIAL INSPECTION

Although differences between the Soviet and the Western positions were not reconciled at the 1956 conference, the U.S.S.R. did come somewhat closer to what the West regarded as essential. It agreed that inspectors should be at their posts before reduction of armaments began, and for the first time identified the types of facilities that would be subject to inspection—with the significant omission of atomic energy installations.¹¹

The Soviet Union finally came around last autumn to limited acceptance of the idea of aerial inspection. Proposing a seven-step disarmament program, Bulganin in a letter to President Eisenhower on Nov. 17, 1956, stated that

¹¹ Ten days after the talks had ended, Moscow on May 14, 1956, announced an intention to cut Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men. At the same time, it denounced the U.S. aerial inspection plan as an espionage scheme.

the U.S.S.R. was "prepared to consider" the use of aerial photography in an area extending about 480 miles east and west of the line between the principal armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Europe. He said the Soviet Union was offering that concession in order to facilitate agreement on the other elements¹² of its proposal, and he urged another summit conference to deal with disarmament. President Eisenhower replied at the end of the year that the United States preferred to pursue the matter through the United Nations.

Approach To Synthesis of Major Power Plans

THE U.N. DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE began its current session at London last Mar. 18 under a General Assembly recommendation that it continue consideration of the American plan for aerial inspection and exchange of blueprints, the Soviet plan for control posts at key locations, and a number of other proposals. Included in the last-mentioned group was a new U.S. program submitted to the Political Committee of the General Assembly last Jan. 14 by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Among other things, it proposed:

Conclusion of an agreement providing for use of all future production of fissionable materials solely for non-weapons purposes under effective international inspection.

Progress toward a first-stage reduction of conventional armaments and forces and concurrent establishment of an inspection system to include both aerial and ground operations.

Progressive installation of inspection systems to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack.

Lodge said the United States was willing to have aerial inspection and exchange of blueprints carried out "either as an opening step or a later step." Previously Washington had insisted that both be instituted at the beginning of any disarmament program.

¹² Reduction of armed forces, ban on nuclear weapons, cutback in troops stationed in Germany, reduction of forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, liquidation of overseas bases, curtailment of military spending, and establishment of a system of international control which would include ground control posts.

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U.S. AND SOVIET CHOICES OF AERIAL INSPECTION ZONES

Shortly before Easter, Harold Stassen is understood to have suggested—"informally and for illustrative purposes only"—to Valerian A. Zorin, chief Soviet delegate, that aerial inspection might be begun in two zones. In Europe he suggested a cone-shaped area running from the North Pole down to 45° North latitude and bounded on the west by 5° East longitude and on the east by 30° East longitude. That zone would include Scandinavia, Finland, most of the Benelux area, eastern France, Switzerland, northern Italy, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, northern Yugoslavia, most of Rumania, and the western U.S.S.R. up to a line just missing Leningrad.

For the North Pacific Stassen suggested a pie-shaped area extending from the North Pole down to 45° North latitude and bounded on the west by 160° East longitude and on the east by 140° West longitude. That zone would include Alaska and an area of the Soviet Far East of about the same size just across the Bering Sea.

Moscow replied on Apr. 30 with two counter-proposals. In Europe it proposed a rectangular zone bounded on the north by 54° North latitude, on the south by 39° 38' North latitude, on the west by the Zero meridian, and on the east by 25° East longitude. Placed slightly farther west than the zone suggested by the United States, it would include part of Great Britain, most of France and Italy, all of Yugoslavia and Albania, northern Greece, and the western half of Bulgaria. However, it would extend only a short way into the Soviet Union. Also, it would include the western rather than the northern part of Rumania, and would exclude Scandinavia and Finland. Otherwise, the zone would embrace the same countries suggested by Stassen.

Countering the suggestion of a zone in the Bering Sea area, Moscow proposed a vastly larger area to include all of Soviet Asia from 108° East longitude eastward to the Pacific Ocean and all of the United States from 90° West longitude westward to the Pacific. That would cover roughly half of Soviet Asia east of a line running through Ulan Ude, more than half of the United States west of a line running through St. Louis, also Alaska.

Western officials regarded the Soviet plan as unacceptable in that it equated an area containing the main centers

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of the U.S. aircraft industry and major air and naval bases with a largely barren and comparatively unindustrialized area of Siberia. At the same time, they considered it significant insofar as it marked the first time the Soviet Union had shown willingness to undertake large-scale aerial inspection.¹³

Moscow proposed also a two-stage reduction of armed forces to be carried out under supervision of an international control agency. That organ, established within the framework of the U.N. Security Council, would verify disarmament information supplied by the participating states. Control posts were to be established to assure that there were no dangerous concentrations of forces and armaments.

During the first stage, however, only "a limited number" of control posts would be set up, and only in the western Soviet Union, the eastern United States, the NATO countries, and the Warsaw Pact nations. In that stage, moreover, the posts would be established only at ports, rail junctions, and main highways; none would be set up at airfields until the second stage, and their establishment then would have to be "related to the appropriate measures for the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons."

DEVELOPMENT OF A FLEXIBLE U.S. PLAN FOR INSPECTION

The London talks recessed for ten days in mid-May, and Stassen returned to Washington to obtain an official counter-proposal to the Soviet offer. The new U.S. plan was worked out at a series of high-level conferences, May 23-25, that included a National Security Council session, a White House meeting, and consultations by Stassen and Dulles with the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament.

A statement issued by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), chairman of the Senate subcommittee, on May 23 quoted Stassen as saying that the goal of the counter-proposal was "a first-step agreement for a small-slice arms cut under inspection." The hoped-for agreement reportedly would call, among other things, for the handing over of a certain percentage of major weapons to international inspectors at specified depots, for diversion of future pro-

¹³ President Eisenhower told reporters, May 8, that the Soviet proposal testified to the seriousness of the London talks, but that it would have to be studied very carefully because "It isn't merely acreage that is important . . . [but] what is within the particular areas delineated."

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duction of fissionable materials, under inspection, to peaceful uses, for some limitation on nuclear weapons testing, and for establishment of a zone in which aerial inspection could be started on a trial basis.

The zone was not identified, but Secretary Dulles reportedly advised the subcommittee that it might be confined at first to the region extending from the North Pole down to about the 66th parallel, just below the Arctic Circle; if inspection proved successful there, the zone might be extended eventually to the 60th, 50th, or 40th parallel. Dulles noted that the advantages of an Arctic zone over a European zone lay in the fact that the former was free of large cities and unresolved political problems.¹⁴ Other observers have pointed out that the Arctic region contains the shortest and most likely routes of aerial invasion by either the United States or the U.S.S.R.

Following the White House conference on May 25, Dulles said there was "no inspection area which is so rigidly fixed in our present contemplation that I could define the countries by name." He stated that the plan Stassen was taking to London was "flexible." The American negotiator departed on May 28 and spent the next ten days discussing the new U.S. plan with the NATO powers as a prelude to presenting it to the disarmament subcommittee. Stassen was reported also to have sketched the "broad outlines and general direction of American thinking" in separate conferences with the chief Soviet delegate. He flew to Washington June 9 to report reactions of the negotiators to top U.S. officials.

Problems of Arms Inspection and Control

DIFFICULTIES to be surmounted in instituting and implementing an effective system of arms inspection and control are formidable. Eight task forces, appointed by Stassen and headed by prominent scientists, businessmen, and former military leaders, have been at work for two years studying the "requirements and methods of effective

¹⁴ He had said at a press conference on May 14 that such areas as the Arctic, Alaska, and Siberia "might be an easier place to start" aerial inspection because they were less densely populated and involved fewer political complications.

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international inspection and control." The crux of the inspection problem, Stassen has said, is determining "not only what you can and cannot inspect" in another country "but what would be reciprocally acceptable in the United States."¹⁵

In addition to obtaining agreement on zones and objects of inspection, there are other hard problems. Aerial and ground inspection would require large numbers of highly trained specialists. The personnel for aerial photography are available, but many additional skilled technicians would be needed to interpret the photographs. Even more serious would be the problem of recruiting a sufficient number of adequately trained men to carry out inspection on the ground, especially surveillance of atomic energy installations.

Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, who headed the World War II project that developed the A-bomb, has said that it would be "extremely difficult to get adequate personnel, both as to competence and as to numbers, because the men who are competent to do the job . . . would not be interested in doing that kind of work." Inspection would be the "dullest kind of maintenance work," and most men would not be willing to do it, at least not for more than a year or two.¹⁶

Inspectors would have to be highly competent and trustworthy, also capable of working under conditions of suspicion and ill will. "In the light of the atmosphere of deep distrust which has conditioned the thoughts of citizens of Soviet Russia and the United States about each other for many years, it cannot be expected that the operations of the inspecting personnel . . . could be carried out without the possibility of friction at working levels."¹⁷

W. W. Rostow, an authority on the Soviet Union, has voiced the opinion that operation of a proper inspection scheme—one requiring "thoroughgoing access of all societies to . . . uninhibited, suspicious inspection by nationals of other countries"—would raise some problems even for the United States. But difficulties it would pose for the Soviet Union would be "much greater."

¹⁵ Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament, Washington, D. C., Jan. 24, 1954.

¹⁶ Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament, Washington, D. C., Jan. 10, 1957.

¹⁷ Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament, *Control and Reduction of Armaments: Technical Problems* (Staff Study No. 4, Oct. 7, 1956), p. 16.

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It would be extremely difficult . . . [Rostow continued] for men of the generation of those who now rule in Moscow to envisage the opening up of Soviet society to foreign inspectors on the requisite scale. Inspectors should, for example, have free access to areas where forced labor camps still exist. They should be able to enter factories at times of their own choosing. They should be as free to do their job . . . as bank examiners.

Rostow said that, although the U.S.S.R. had become less of a police state since Stalin's death, there was still "no evidence that freedom has extended down in Soviet society to a point where the regime is prepared to contemplate the kind of uncontrolled inspection which any tolerably realistic system of international armaments control demands."¹⁸

FAILURE OF INSPECTION EFFORTS IN GERMANY AND KOREA

Skeptics on international inspection often have noted the failure of earlier inspection schemes. Although the inter-allied control commissions set up to supervise the arms-limitation program in Germany after World War I had broad inspection powers on paper, they were prevented from doing a thorough job by the hostility of the German public and the resistance of German authorities.¹⁹

The Korean armistice agreement of June 8, 1953, provided for a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, composed of Swedish, Swiss, Czechoslovak, and Polish officers, to assure that stability of the armistice was not upset by the introduction of additional troops or armaments. To make sure that no reinforcements were brought in, the commission appointed more than a dozen inspection teams composed of equal numbers of officers from the same neutral nations. Some teams were stationed at ports and others were held ready for dispatch to locations where violations had been reported. According to the armistice agreement, inspection teams were to be accorded "full convenience of movement within . . . [specified] areas."

The Korean inspection system functioned nominally for nearly three years, but it never really worked. The U.N. Command representative reported to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on May 31, 1956, that when his side called for inspection of violations the Czech and Polish members on the Supervisory Commission either "vetoed

¹⁸ Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament, Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 9, 1956.

¹⁹ For details, see "International Inspection," *E.R.R.*, Vol. II 1946, pp. 841-843.

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such inspections or . . . cooperated with . . . [the Communists] in obstructing the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members . . . so as to render effective inspections . . . impossible." In view of repeated violations of the armistice agreement by the Communist forces and obstructions to inspection by the Communist members of the Supervisory Commission, the U.N. Command demanded withdrawal of the teams from South Korea and that was accomplished in June 1956.

INSPECTION UNDER ATOMS-FOR-PEACE PROJECT

Hope has been expressed that valuable experience in carrying out inspection can be gained through operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency provisionally established by 70 nations last October on the basis of the Eisenhower atoms-for-peace plan. Serving as a world bank for fissionable materials, the agency will have the responsibility of channeling such materials into peaceful projects and thus diminishing the amounts available for weapons uses.

To assure that member nations do not divert their allotments to military uses, I.A.E.A. is to send inspectors into the recipient states. They are to have access to all persons, places, and data involved in projects aided under the plan. Inspectors may be accompanied by officials of the state in which they are carrying out their investigations, but they are not to be impeded in their work.

I.A.E.A. will begin operations as soon as 18 nations, including at least three of the principal atomic powers, have ratified its statute. The statute already has been ratified by the Soviet Union and six other countries; it is now before the U.S. Senate where some opposition has been expressed.

Chairman Lewis L. Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy committees on May 14 that I.A.E.A., by creating a "practical working model of an inspection system," could "facilitate establishment of the broader controls needed for a successful disarmament agreement."

